Reference Entry
CIENFUEGOS CABLE-CUTTING ACTION
On May 11, 1898, crews from Marblehead and Nashville worked close to the Cuban shore under fire to cut submarine cables. The operation damaged communications but did not establish complete isolation of the port.
Scope of this history
The May 11 boat expedition at Cienfuegos during the Spanish-American War, not the same-day action at Cárdenas or later Veracruz operations.
Why a cable station became a naval objective
The United States blockade of Cuba began in April 1898. Ports mattered as points of entry for supplies, but they also connected ships, railways and telegraph networks. Cienfuegos, on Cuba’s southern coast, had railway communication with Havana. Cutting its cables promised to interfere with the movement of information as well as reinforce pressure on maritime traffic. A naval force could threaten those connections without first occupying the city. [1]
Telegraph cables lay on the seabed, so destroying the shore station did not necessarily remove every usable connection. The boats had to locate the cables, raise them and cut out sections. This required slow, exposed work near shore rather than a brief dash past the defenses. [2]
Ships and the working expedition
Commander Bowman H. McCalla organized the expedition from Marblehead and Nashville. Lieutenant Cameron M. Winslow directed the boats, with Lieutenant Edwin A. Anderson commanding another working party. Steam launches supported the small boats in which men would grapple for cables and handle tools. The crews thus depended on several distinct elements: those performing the work, those moving the boats, and the ships providing covering fire. [3]
Anderson’s later naval biography emphasizes the practical danger of boat command. When his coxswain was wounded, he took the helm himself. That episode was part of the Cienfuegos expedition, but Anderson’s Medal of Honor belonged to his later service at Veracruz in 1914. A biography can connect the two operations in one career without making them the same award action. [4]
Approaching a defended shore
The ships bombarded the shore positions before the boats began their most exposed work. Fire damaged the blockhouse and cable station, yet riflemen could still threaten men working near the coast. Heavy naval guns and small-boat labor were complementary rather than interchangeable. Bombardment could suppress visible defenses; it could not lift a cable from the bottom or make the task instantaneous. [3]
Winslow’s biographical record describes improvised hand-tool work and the need to maintain command despite being wounded in the hand. The cable party was not a specialist engineering detachment working in controlled conditions. Its experience illustrates a recurring naval problem: a crew trained for many shipboard duties could suddenly be required to perform a technical task while the ship’s protective structure was no longer around it. [5]
The technical task under fire
McCalla’s subsequent account distinguishes the larger outer cables from a smaller inner one. Sections were removed from the cables successfully cut, rather than merely breaking a line at a single point. That difference mattered because a missing length complicated immediate reconnection. The retrospective also acknowledges uncertainty about other routes in the communications network, a warning against treating damage to two lines as proof that every path had been disabled. [2]
Benjamin F. Baker’s citation places him in the Cienfuegos cable-cutting boat party under heavy shore fire. Other records, including those for David D. Barrow and Austin J. Durney, describe the same operation from their service aboard Nashville. The repeated language reflects participation in a common hazardous task. It does not establish that every man handled the same cable, occupied the same boat position, or performed an identical individual movement. [6] [7] [8]
Withdrawal and incomplete isolation
Two cables were cut before the expedition withdrew under increasing pressure. The attempt to deal with another line was abandoned. The operation therefore achieved a material result without fully realizing the broader aim of severing communications. Describing it only as a complete success would erase the difference between the work the crews accomplished and the network that still existed when the boats left. [3]
The ship biographies emphasize getting the exposed boats and wounded men back under protection. Anderson’s boat had suffered damage, and the supporting vessels’ gunfire remained important during withdrawal. The end of an expedition is part of its tactical history: men who have completed a difficult task ashore or near a beach must still disengage, recover casualties and reach their supporting force. [4]
Cienfuegos was not Cárdenas
Other fighting occurred in Cuban waters on May 11. The Navy’s archival engagement list places Windom at Cienfuegos but the torpedo boat Winslow at Cárdenas. Cameron Winslow, the officer leading the cable expedition, should not be confused with the ship bearing that name. Shared dates, similar names and the same war are insufficient reasons to move a citation from one engagement to another. [9]
The institutional War with Spain citation collection likewise separates the places and activities described in individual awards. For this article, the relevant association is the identified Cienfuegos boat operation. A recipient who served during the war, or whose metadata happens to carry May 11, is not automatically a member of this particular cable party. [10]
What the operation reveals
Cienfuegos shows a form of naval combat that is easily lost in accounts organized only around fleets and decisive sea battles. A telegraph network could be an operational target, a rowboat could become the exposed working platform, and technical persistence could matter as much as the weight of guns offshore. The evidence also preserves the limits of the result: disruption of an enemy system and complete destruction of that system are different claims. [2] [1]
The linked profiles retain their separate identities and source citations. Joseph F. Scott’s account, for example, identifies the cable-cutting action rather than a general campaign award. Reading those profiles beside the operational narrative makes the collective task understandable while leaving each record intact. The collection below is the reviewed selection available in this archive, not a newly reconstructed or universally complete award roll. [11]
Source notes
Sources and further reading
Institutional histories establish the battle, incident, or unit context. Linked Trackpads recipient records preserve the award citations used for individual actions. The connections below are a reviewed selection, not a complete historical roll of awards.
- NHHC — Blockade of northern Cuba ↗
- NHHC — McCalla on cable cutting and telegraphy ↗
- NHHC — Battle at Punta de los Colorados ↗
- NHHC — DANFS: Anderson ↗
- NHHC — Cameron M. Winslow ↗
- Benjamin F. Baker — preserved award citation
- David Duffy Barrow — preserved award citation
- Austin Joseph Durney — preserved award citation
- NHHC — List of naval engagements in Cuban waters ↗
- U.S. Army — War with Spain Medal of Honor citations ↗
- Joseph Francis Scott — preserved award citation